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THE FACTS 
The factual situation, as presented by the Plaintiff, is 
not substantially in dispute. Some additional historical 
background may, however, be beneficial and of aid to the 
Court in understanding and considering the problems to 
be resolved. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
At the beginning of World War II, the United States 
of America constructed in North Davis County several lines 
of outfall sewer. This construction was for the purpose of 
providing sanitary facilities for military installations and 
adjacent housing. After the war, the government desired 
to divest itself of these facilities. In the year, 1946, the 
communities of Layton, Syracuse, Sunset, Clearfield, Roy, 
Clinton and Laytona formed an unincorporated association, 
known as the North Davis Metropolitan Sewer. This assoc-
iation thereupon entered into a lease and purchase agree-
ment to acquire the above-referred to governmental facil-
ities. As time went on, the rapid population growth made it 
apparent to the Board of Directors of the association that 
North Davis County was in imminent need of a vastly ex-
panded sanitary sewer project. 
FORMATION OF DISTRICT 
As a result of the urgency and extreme need for addi-
tional outfall lines and the need for an adequate treatment 
plant, the Board of Directors for the 1\fetropolitan Sewer 
determined to promote the creation of a legally recognized 
improvement district. The creation of such a district was 
necessary to provide the legal machinery for the authoriz-
ation, issuance and sale of bonds to raise money for the 
needed construction. As a result of the efforts of the citizens 
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of North Davis County, the Board of County Commission-
ers of Davis County, with the concurrence of the Board of 
:a! County Commissioners of Weber County, did on Thursday, 
b1 the 15th day of July, 1954, pass and adopt a resolution, 
to legally creating and establishing an improvement district 
known as the "North Davis County Sewer District," which 
said District was created pursuant to authority made and 
provided in Title 17, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
ate: as amended by the Laws of Utah, 1953. Immediately there-
fu,t' after, the Board of Trustees met and organized the new 
~ ,; district. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA 
The area of the North Davis County Sewer District 
D is essentially all that portion of Davis County lying north 
1j~ of the North Boundary of the City of Kaysville and includ-
ing, generally, the City and Precinct of Roy, Weber County, 
and which said district is bounded on the west by the Great 
Salt Lake and on the east by the foot of the Wasatch Moun-
tains. The District includes the Municipalities of Clearfield, 
East Layton, Sunset, West Point, Laytona, Clinton, Syracuse 
and Layton in Davis County and the City of Roy in Weber 
County. 
NEED FOR SANITARY FACILITIES 
In addition to the population centers above-named, 
the district has considerable industry which is rapidly ex-
panding and which has a tremendous immediate and future 
potential. 
The United States of America, also maintains within 
the district three large military installations, namely:The 
Clearfield Naval Supply Depot, Hill Air Force Base and 
Hill Air Force Base, West Sector. Total present workers at 
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these installations is approximately 15,000 with several 
times that many in event of any national emergency. All 
of the district lies within the recently created Weber Basin 
Water Conservancy District, and with the coming of an 
adequate water supply, it is expected that the area will re-
ceive a tremendous impetus to industrial and residential 
growth. The population of the area in 1947 stood at 12,075, 
for 1950, 22,000 and the statistical population, estimated, 
places the population for 1973 at a minimum of 47,980. 
With the rapidly expanding population, and the indust-
rial growth within the district, there is presently a great 
urgency for the construction of additional sanitary sewer 
facilities, including a modern treatment plant. 
The State of Utah, through its legislature, did in 1953, 
pass an act creating the State Water Pollution Control 
Board. This Board has undertaken a program to compel all 
municipalities to provide adequate treatment of raw sewage. 
Such treatment will be required where untreated sewage 
may contaminate water under state control and 'classifi-
cation'. The present site of disposal of sewage from the 
district is the Great Salt Lake. This body of water is under 
the control and jurisdiction of said Water Pollution Con-
trol Board. The District is working in close harmony with 
the Water Pollution Control Board and the contemplated 
treatment plant and disposal of effluent therefrom has been 
approved by said Water Pollution Control Board. 
Realization of the tremendous population, industrial 
and military growth of the District makes it apparent this 
area cannot continue in growth without the contemplated 
expansion of sanitary facilities. Failure to provide additional 
sanitary facilities would jeopardize the entire future growth 
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• 
of the district and place in peril the health and welfare of 
the inhabitants of said District. 
To provide funds for the needed construction of new and 
additional sanitary facilities including an adequate 'treat-
ment' plant, the Board of Trustees called a special election 
of all the qualified taxpaying electors within the District for 
the third day of May, 1955. At said special election, the 
proposition of issuing $2,900,000 of bonds of the District 
was submitted to said electors. This proposition was over-
whelmingly approved. At said election $2,100,000 of the 
authorized bonds were voted as general obligation bonds and 
$800,000 of said issue were voted as revenue bonds payable 
from the revenue of the District. To obtain part of the 
revenue to retire said general obligation and revenue bonds 
and pay the interest thereon, it becomes necessary for the 
District to charge the various municipalities, within the 
District, for the use of its sanitary disposal lines and 
treatment plant. To accomplish that purpose, a uniform 
contract was prepared and submitted to all of the munici-
palities within the District. All of said municipalities have 
heretofore through their proper governing bodies duly 
executed said contract. A copy of said contract is before 
the Court in this proceeding and is alluded to in both the 
Plaintiff's Brief, and later on in this Brief for the Defend-
ant. 
PLAN FOR DEVELOPMENT 
The North Davis County Sewer District project was 
planned to prepare for the industrial, commercial and res-
idential expansion of North Davis County and the Roy, 
Weber County area. The project program calls for con-
struction of a modern sewage treatment plant west of 
Syracuse, Utah. This will be a two stage, high rate filter 
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• 
plant and will produce an effluent meeting Utah State 
Water Pollution Control Board standards for irrigation 
water. It will provide capacity for the next ten to fifteen 
years and will be so designed that additions may be made 
as required without loss of value of the initial construction. 
It will provide that type of treatment necessarily required 
for the protection of the health and safety of the inhabitants 
of the entire area. 
The physical plant consisting of outfall lines and treat-
ment plant will be so designed and located as to make full 
and complete utilization of all facilities previously construc-
ted and which have been acquired by the present District 
and the present system will become an intregal and func-
tioning part of the new overall system. There will be con-
structed a new outfall main to provide new outlets for 
Roy, Clinton, Westpoint, and Syracuse and will permit 
relief sewers to be installed from the existing main at points 
in Roy, Clinton, West Point, and Syracuse. A new outfall 
line will also be laid from the sewage treatment plant in 
southeasterly direction to intercept the Syracuse outfall 
main and continue southeasterly to intercept the Layton 
outfall main and from there, there will be constructed 
interceptors to the Clearfield City limits. From this inter-
ceptor a new main will be laid to intercept the present 
outfall from Hill Air Force Base. A new outfall will also be 
constructed along the south side of the Clearfield Naval 
Supply Depot to relieve the overloaded situation of Clear-
field City and the Clearfield Naval Supply mains at this 
point. A considerable amount of the outfall mains have 
already been placed under contract and the work actually 
completed. This has been financed from money raised from 
the sale of the General Obligation bonds above referred to. 
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It is contemplated that the teatment plant will cost approx-
imately one million dollars; eight hundred thousand of 
which must be raised from the sale of the revenue bonds. It 
might also be of interest to note that the effluent from the 
treatment plant will be disposed of in cooperation with the 
Water Pollution Control Board and Civic groups interested 
in the promotion of wild life. Through such cooperation it 
is hoped that a vast area for water foul may be opened and 
protected. It is generally conceded that the area is now fast 
becoming useless for such purposes by reason of the grow-
ing pollution. 
We wish to emphasize the plan of development con-
templates all future expansion. The project is so designed 
that all future needs and requirements can be met by the 
construction of additional facilities and that by reason of 
this planning, no separate installations or treatment plants 
will ever be required by a municipality or segment lying 
within the boundries of the District. As the project relates to 
the separate municipalities and the individual, it presents the 
most economically feaseable method of collecting, dispos-
ing of and treating the sewage emanating from said territory 
in said district. 
The question now has arisen as to whether municipal 
sewer contracts in the form executed by Layton City are 
valid in view of constitutional and statutory debt limita-
tions on municipalities. This is the question now before the 
Court. 
While these proceedings directly challenge the power 
of Layton City to enter into the contract with the District, 
the questions raised are not limited in applicability to Lay-
City alone, but are and will be present in the contracts of all 
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of the municipalities seeking the sewer disposal and treat-
ment service which can only be furnished by the District, 
the municipalities involved being nine in number. The form 
of the contract is the same in each case. The amount will 
vary, of course, in accordance with municipal needs based 
upon the number of sewer "connections." Thus, it is appar-
ent that the decision upon the question of the validity of this 
contract, will in effect, determine the validity of municipal 
participation of all the municipalities in the entire project-
indeed will determine the economical feasibility of the 
project. For without firm contracts from the municipal-
ities, the completed disposal system and treatment plant 
cannot be made available. 
With this background and statement of plan of devel-
opment, we proceed to answer the contentions of Plaintiff 
that the so called Layton contract is invalid and beyond 
the powers of Layton City, its Mayor, and Councilmen, to 
effect. We will answer the points of argument seriatum: 
THE ARGUMENT 
I and IT 
THE CONTRACT IS NOT INVALID AS CREATING A 
DEBT IN EXCESS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMI-
TATIONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
This point of argument, as we understand it, is to the 
effect that the contract creates a debt both in excess of 
the city taxes for the current year (current revenues) and 
the constitutional debt limitations of Layton City in vio-
lation of Section 3 and 4 of Article XIV of the Constitution 
of Utah. This contention of the Plaintiff seems to be based 
upon the theory that the sum total or aggregate amounts 
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involved in the contract creates an immediate and irrevoc-
able debt to the extent of such aggregate amounts. It is 
admitted by the Defendants that the amounts involved, 
if treated as debt, are in excess of such limitation; but we 
contend that there is no violation of the constitutional debt 
limitations in any event because the contract does not 
create a debt and particularly not a debt within the mean-
ing of the Constitution. 
(A) "SPECIAL FUND" DOCTRINE. 
The Plaintiff further seems to labor under the illusion 
and the theory that the Defendants' situation does not 
come within the "special fund' doctrine as enunciated by 
this Court in the cases cited by the Plaintiff. We prefer to 
meet this argument head on. It is the contention of the 
Defendants that the contract can be sustained and stand 
legally unimpaired on other doctrines and factors and that 
the position of the Defendants need not be sustained solely 
upon the basis of the "special fund" doctrine. In fact, it is 
our contention that the instant case fits squarely within the 
"special fund" doctrine or "restricted special fund" doctrine 
as enunciated and defined by the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah in Condor vs. University of Utah and Barlow 
vs. Clearfield City J infra. 
The defendant city, Layton City, is not now attempt-
ing and never has attempted and under the terms of the 
contract does not intend to obtain or receive any monies 
which are to be repaid out of any facilities, either facilities 
presently owned or to be owned by such City in the future. 
The instant contract is not a financing contract for Layton 
City by the terms of which Layton City is attempting to 
raise funds for the construction of any new facility or the 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
maintenance of any old facility. The contract, stated simply, 
is a contract whereby Layton City seeks to obtain and en-
joy certain necessary benefits which said City can not in-
dependently, financially afford to provide itself. The serv-
ices to be furnished provides for the transportion away from 
the city limits of Layton City, all of its raw sanitary sewage, 
and thereafter the proper and adequate sanitary treatment 
of such sewage. The contract provides for the obtaining of 
this service which can not be provided by Layton City as a 
single municipality. The contract provides an equitable 
"pay as you go" method for paying for such service. It will be 
understood from the reading of the contract that the City in 
essence agrees to pay to the district the sum of 80 cents per 
month per sewer connection; in return for which payment, 
the District agrees to carry from the boundries of Layton 
City to the shores of the Great Salt Lake, all the raw 
Sewage of said City and thereupon to treat the same in 
a modern, adequate, sewage treatment plant which will 
shortly be under construction. 
It will be noted here that the 80 cents per month con-
nection charge which will be made by Layton City for the 
use of the facility, and which will be paid over to the District, 
constitutes a fund or an amount of money which was not at 
the time of entering into the contract or prior thereto, 
available to the City of Layton for any other purpose. It 
does not constitute a fund and never has, that need be 
replenished from any other source such as from advalorem 
taxes. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion 
that the instant case comes squarely within the rule as 
enunciated by this court in Condor vs. University and Barlow 
vs. Clearfield City, infra. The City cannot be coerced into 
levying any tax for this purpose or for the purpose of 
10 
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replenishing any fund. In the Condor case this court said: 
"If the validity of the special fund doctrine be 
assumed, the debt affected by constitutional limita-
tions is an obligation for the payment of which the 
levy of taxes may be required. It is inconsistent with 
that assumption to treat as debt an obligation for the 
payment of which taxation cannot be required." 
In Barlow vs. Clearfield City) infra, the court said among 
other things: 
"Here it is clear that the City cannot be coerced 
into levying a tax to meet this obligati'on, although it 
may pay the whole or part thereof from the water 
revenues or other sources . . . We hold that these 
facts do not make this a debt of the City." 
Under these rulings and interpretations, it is the contention 
of the Defendants that the instant case falls squarely within 
the doctrine thus enunciated in the Condor and Barlow 
cases. 
It is further noted from a reading of the contract that 
the City is not obligated to pay any amount certain other 
than the monthly per connection "charge" and this "charge" 
only when the District furnishes to Layton City the above 
described services. Layton City is presently and for some 
years past, has been accepting and receiving such service 
from the North Metropolitan Sewer Board, assignor of the 
District. 
Let us turn our attention to some of the language in 
the cases cited by the Plaintiff's counsel which reflect upon 
the question of the determination of when a "debt" of a mun-
icipality has been created. 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the case of Barlow vs. Clearfield City.) 268 Pac. 
2nd at page 682 this Court stated: 
"Thus it is clear that whether or not the City 
can be coerced into levying a tax to pay the obliga-
tion either directly or indirectly is held to be a strong 
factor in determining whether or not an obligation is 
a debt of the City. Here it is clear that the City can 
not be coerced into levying a tax to meet this obliga-
tion, although it may pay the whole or a part thereof 
from the water revenues or other sources. If the City 
fails to make any part of such a payment, the bal-
ance n1ust be collected through a tax levy by the 
Board of Directors of the District upon the property 
within the City. The water was allotted to the City 
upon its petition. The City will distribute the water 
delivered under such allotment and will collect the 
revenues for the use thereof. We hold that these 
facts do not make this a debt of the City." 
See also: Condor vs. Un·iversity of Utah) Infra 
In this connection, we quote from the instant contract 
on page 4 thereof, the following language: 
"The District shall never have the right to 
demand payment of any obligation devolving on the 
City under this agreement, from funds raised or to 
be raised by taxation; and all obligations so devolving 
on the City shall never be construed to be a debt of 
the City of such kind as to require the levy and col-
lection of a tax to discharge such obligation, it being 
expressly understood by the parties hereto that the 
District shall not have the right to require the City 
to make any payment due hereunder from any 
source other than monies received from the City 
for the operation of its sanitary sewer system; and 
that all payments to be so made hereunder shall 
constitute operating expenses of such sanitary sewer 
12 
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system; provided, however, that nothing in this par-
agraph contained shall be so consrued as to preclude 
the making of such payment by the City from any 
money or revenues which it may have on hand avail-
able for such purpose. The City agrees to impose 
such rates and charges for services supplied by 
sanitary sewer system as will make possible the 
prompt payment of all expenses incurred in oper-
ating and maintaining such systems, including the 
/ payments due hereunder, and the prompt payment 
of all obligations of the City payable from the reven-
ues of such systems.'' 
In fact, we think that the case of Barlow vs. Clearfield 
City Corp., supra, has determined and disposed of the issues 
raised by the claimant under Points I and II. However, we 
feel that we should point out, as will be done later on, the 
similarity between the two cases and the fact that the 
present contract as to Points I and II can be more readily 
sustained that the contract involved in the Barlow vs. Clear-
field case above cited. However, we would like to comment 
further on the Plaintiff's thinking respecting the "special 
fund" doctrine. We reiterate that Layton City, in entering 
into this contract is not attempting to borrow money or to 
dispose of any corporate securities for the purpose of ob-
taining money under loan for the construction of any mini-
cipal facilities, in fact, such City already owns its municipal 
sewer and is constantly adding extentions thereto from funds 
derived from present sources. In entering into this contract, 
Layton City in no way seeks to raise new revenue, to ob-
tain a loan of money, or to obtain credit from the District 
or from any other source. 
Plaintiff objects to the use of certain language in the 
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contract whi~h he says is an attempt to bring the contract 
under the "special fund" doctrine and thus avoid having 
the contract construed as creating a debt and within the 
meaning of the constitutional limitation. We do not find 
anything wrong in writing a contract to comply with 
existing laws and existing constitutional provision. It ap-
pears, however, that Plaintiff misconstrues the purpose of 
the language. The provision complained of has been quoted 
above and refers to. the fact that the District shall never 
have the right to demand payment of any obligation de-
volving on the City under this agreement from funds raised 
or to be raised from taxation. It is our contention that this 
language was used for the purpose of establishing that any 
obligation being created under the contract is not an im-
mediate debt or a general obligation of the City nor a pledge 
of revenues from a presently owned city facility, and, there-
fore, is not a debt within the meaning of the Constitution; 
and comes within the rules established in Condor vs. Uni-
versity of Utah and Barlow vs. Clearfield City. See also: 
Joseph vs. Joseph Waterworks Co.~ III Pac. 864~ Cunning-
ham vs. Cleveland~ 98 Fed. 651 and Herman vs. Oconto 86 
N. W. 681. 
(B) CONTRACT DOES NOT CREATE "DEBT'' IN EX-
CESS OF TAXES FOR CURRENT YEAR. 
We quite agree with the Plaintiff in stating that the 
evident purpose of the constitutional provisions of Section 
3 and 4 of Article XIV of the Constitution of Utah is to 
keep each municipality within its current income and on a 
"pay as you go" plan and not to incur indebtedness outside 
the current taxes and other revenue for the year. We think 
Layton City is here doing exactly that. Let us briefly ex-
amine Layton City's position in this connection with refer-
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ence to entering into of the instant contract. Heretofore, 
Layton City has been paying to the old Metropolitan Sewer 
District the sum of 50 cents, per month for each sewer 
connection which entitled the City to empty its raw sewage 
into the trunklines originally owned by the Metropolitan 
District. The Metropolitan Disrict has now assigned all of 
those lines to the new North Davis County Sewer District, 
and by bonding said New District, additional extensions and 
expensive lines have now been installed and construction 
of a new treatment plant will shortly be underway. These 
new facilities were necessary to adequately care for Layton 
City and the other municipalities in the Disrict to be served. 
The old lines were inadequate and no treatment was pro-
vided. Upon entering into the present contract Layton City, 
together with all the other municipalities within the District 
raised its local municipal sewer service rates by an additional 
30 cents. The 30 cents coupled together with the original 
50 cents that was already being charged the users of the 
old Sewer District complete the payment of 80 cents per 
month for each individual sewer connector. A brief an-
nalysis of this situation will immediately show and reveal 
that in any event the contract being entered into will not 
place Layton City beyond a "pay as you go" basis, for 
automatically as new connections are made to the Layton 
City sewer collection system, Layton City's monthly and an-
nual revenues from such sources will increase. For example, 
one thousand new connections to Layton City's collection 
system would automatically increase the city's obligation to 
the District to the extent of $800.00 per month but at the 
same time would automatically incr.ease Layton City's 
revenue by the sum of $800.00 per month. 
It is also interesting to note in this conection that each 
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of the municipalities that lie within the North Davis County 
Sewer District charge its users, the citizens of the municip-
ality, different and various rates. Some communities charge 
a $1.50 per month per connection, others charge as high as 
$2.65 per connection. The defendent district has no power 
nor has ever sought any power to direct or influence the 
municipalities as to what charge could be made per month 
for each individual residence or place of business connected 
to a municipal sewer collection system. That is a matter of 
strictly local concern and the only interest that the District 
has in such charges is that each municipality charge suf-
ficient to pay over to the District 80 cents per month over 
and above the sums that may be required by the local 
municipality for operation and maintenance of its own col-
lection system and for its own bond retirement and interest 
sinking flli'1ds, if any. We note that this Court heretofore 
has construed the word "taxes" to mean revenue from all 
sources, including revenue from taxes, fines, forfeitures, 
and all other sources. This being so, it can readily be under-
stood, as above pointed out, that Layton City will always 
be, as far as this contract is concerned, within its estimated 
revenues for the current year for the reason that its sewer 
payment charges to the District will be determined in 
direct proportion to the number of connectors to its own 
sewer collection system. As the City's obligation under the 
contract increases, the collection rates and amounts col-
lected from its own sewer will increase automatically in 
the same proportion. Layton City will never be compelled 
under the terms of this contract to pay over to the North 
Davis County Sewer District any sum in any one year 
which will exceed the sum or sums which Layton City will 
collect from the users of its own sewer system. This being 
so, we are of the opinion that this contract comes squarely 
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within the rules set forth by Plaintiff's counsel with respect 
to staying within a "pay as you go" financial condition. 
Should the District at any time require a rate higher than 
that stated in the contract, the City under its powers may 
levy a higher rate from its users and thereby automatically 
increase its current revenues for the year. Should the pop-
ulation of the District increase to the point where the rates 
referred to can be lowered, then Layton City under its muni-
cipal powers can automatically lower its rates so that there 
would be a constant factor or level between income and the 
outgo required under the terms of contract. 
(C) CONTRACT DOES NOT CREATE "DEBT" OR 
"PLEDGE" WITHIN MEANING OF EITHER SECTION 
3 OR 4, ARTICLE XIV, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
We now proceed to our contention that the contract does 
not create a debt of Layton City or a pledge against any 
"special fund" which must be "fed" from taxation or a debt 
within the meaning of Article XIV, Section 3 and 4, Consti-
tution of Utah. As set forth above, Plaintiff urges in support 
of Points I and II of his brief, that Layton City acted in ex-
cess of its lawful powers, in that: 
"The contract results in a debt of Layton City 
in excess of taxes for the current year without the 
proposition to create such debt having been sub-
mitted to the Layton electors, in violation of Article 
XIV, Section 3, Constitution of Utah." 
These points we continue to consider together because 
if either are true, both of them are true. Defendants contend, 
however, that neither are true. We refer to the admitted 
facts. There is, accordingly, no dispute that if these provis-
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ions of the Constitution are held applicable and it is the sum 
total or aggregate of the payments that are to be considered 
as distinquished from any monthly or annual payment, then 
the obligation that has been created contravenes both Sec-
tions 3 and 4 of the Constitution. On the other hand, if 
neither Sections 3 and 4 of the Constitution are applicable, 
or if applicable) the extent of their applicability is to but a 
single monthly payment rather than the total of the pay-
ments, then there has been no contravention of the Con-
stitution as urged by the Plaintiff. We urge: The consitut-
ional limitation, if applicable at all, are applicable only to 
single payments and not to the sum total thereof. In con-
sidering this phase of the case, we are of the opinion that 
the general rule or perhaps more accurately, the weight of 
authority, is that where a municipality obligates itself 
unconditionally to pay a sum certain each year for a number 
of years, an indebtedness is immediately created for the 
aggregate annual installments, and not merely to each in-
stallment as it comes due. Conversely, the general rule is 
that a present indebtedness is not created for the aggregate 
of all periodic installments provided for by the contract for 
the rendition or furnishing of service in the future, where 
the installments do not come due until and unless the service 
is rendered. The usual example of the first type of case is 
where a municipality, in order to finance a facility, issues 
bonds payable in future years. Under such circumstances, 
an indebtedness for the sum total of the amount payable has 
been presently created, and it it exceeds constitutional limit-
ations, it is void. The second type of case may be designated 
as the continuing service type of contract. An extensive 
annotation of this type of contract is to be found in 103 A. 
L. R. at page 1160. There, innumerable cases are cited and 
discussed, with the Courts almost uniformly following the 
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lead of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case 
of Walla Walla vs. Walla Walla Water Co.} 172 U. S. 1} 43 
Law Ed. 341} where it was held: 
"We think the weight of authority as well as of 
reason favors the more liberal construction that a 
Municipal Corporation may contract for a supply of 
water or gas or like necessary, and may stipulate 
for the payment of an annual rental for the gas or 
water furnished each year, not withstanding, the 
aggregate of its rentals during the life of the con-
tract may exceed the amount of the indebtedness 
limited by the charter. There is a distinction between 
a debt and a contract for a future indebtedness to be 
incurred, provided the contracting party performs 
the agreement out of which the debt may arise. 
There is also a distinction between the latter case 
and one where an absolute debt is created at once, as 
by the issue of railway bonds or for the erection of 
a public improvement, though such debt be payable in 
the future by installments. In the one case, the in-
debtedness is not created until the consideration has 
been furnished. In the other, the debt is created at 
once, the time of payment being only postponed. 
In the case under consideration, the annual rental 
did not become an indebtedness within the meaning 
of the charter until the water appropriated to that 
year had been furnished. If the company had failed to 
furnish it, the rental would not have been payable at 
all, and while the original contract provided for the 
creation of an indebtedness, it was only upon con-
dition that the company perform its own obligation." 
In light of the above language, let us consider for a moment 
the terms of the contract in this regard. Paragraph One of 
of the contract provides as follows: 
"The District agrees to proceed promptly with 
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the construction of the additional disposal facilities 
and it is expressly agreed that the obligation on the 
part of the District to construct the additional fa-
cilities shall be conditioned upon the District's abil-
ity to obtain all necessary materials, labor and equip-
ment, and the ability of the District to finance the 
cost of such construction in a manner and at a cost 
satisfactory to the District in its sole discretion. 
From and after the execution of this agreement, the 
District will, to the extent that its existing facilities 
permit, and to the extent that any part of the addit-
ional facilities are necessary therefor, from and 
after the completion of such necessary additional 
facilities continually hold itself ready and able to 
treat and dispose of sewage turned into the District's 
disposal facilities by the City in a manner provided 
and that it will accept, treat, and dispose of such 
sewage as so provided." 
Section 6 of the contract, in brief form, provides: 
"That, in case by reason of Force Majeure, 
either party thereto shall be rendered unable, wholly 
or in part, to carry out its obligations under the 
agreement other than the obligations of the City to 
make the payments required under the terms there-
of, then each such party shall give notice and full 
particulars of such Force Majeure in writing to the 
other party within a reasonable time after occurence 
of the event or cause relied on, and the obligations 
of the parties giving such notice, so far as they are 
affected by such Force 1\iajeure, shall be suspended 
during the continuance of the inability then claimed." 
It thus seems clear from a reading of the above quoted 
sections 1 and 6 of the contract, that it is the intent of the 
parties to the contract that the City's obligation to make 
payments are conditioned upon the ability of the District to 
furnish and upon the actual furnishing by the District to 
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the City the services of the District for the purposes and 
intents of the contract. That should the District at any time 
be unable to perform its services to accept the raw sewage of 
the City, that the City shall be relieved of its obligations 
under the contract to make the payments therein provided 
for. It is the position of the Defendants, therefore, that the 
wording of the contract now before the Court brings the 
contract clearly within the doctrine enunciated in Walla 
Walla vs. Walla Walla Water Co.) supra, and other cases 
therein cited and hereinafter referred to. 
The Defendants urge that the contract in question is 
a contract for a needed municipal service to be paid for on 
a monthly or periodic basis as the services are received, 
enjoyed, and used to the beneficial advantage of the City 
of Layton and the Inhabitants thereof. It is interesting to 
note from an examination of the other cases cited in the 
Annotation and coming from perhaps two dozen different 
states, that in almost every case, the Courts made a studied 
effort to bring the contracts there under consideration 
under the doctrine of Walla Walla, apparently recognizing 
the need for an interpretation which would permit their 
Cities to secure vital municipal necessities over an extended 
period of time. 
(D) COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PRESENT CASE TO 
BARLOW VS. CLEARFIELD CITY. 
It would now be well to attempt a short comparative 
analysis between the present case and the case of Barlow 
vs. Clearfield City Corp. et al., a Utah case reported at 268 
P. 2nd 682. The two contracts involved are similar in that 
in each case a municipality seeks to purchase on a pay as 
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you go basis, a needed and necessary municipal service. 
In the Barlow case an adequate water suply; in the case at 
hand an adequate, available and necessary method of dis-
posing of the sanitary sewage waste of the City, and thus 
attempting to preserve the health of the inhabitants of the 
City. The contract in the Barlow case was looked upon with 
favor by this Court and the contract sustained as not being 
void by reason of creating a debt in excess of the constitu-
tionallimiations as set forth in Article XIV, Sections 3 and 4 
of the Constitution of Utah. We now wish to point out that 
in the Barlow case the contract contained several very im-
portant elements which the Court had to contend with in 
writing its decision which are not incorporated in the pres-
ent contract. First} the City in the Barlow vs. Clearfield 
case agreed to pay a "fair proportion of the amount of est-
imated, operating and maintenance charges of the District 
for the next succeeding calendar year. Such fair proportion 
and amount shall be determined each year by the Board of 
Directors of the District and the determination shall be 
final and conclusive/} Second} the Clearfield contract pro-
vided that the annual amount specified shall be paid 
whether or not all or any part of the water allotted is called 
for or used by the City. Third) the Clearfield contract pro-
vided that the Board of Directors of the District shall have 
the power to levy annually upon the property within the 
City, taxes at rates sufficient to produce the annual amounts 
specified in the contract less any amount paid or undertaken 
to be paid from water revenues and from other sources. In 
making such annual levies, the Board of Directors of the 
District shall take into account the deficiencies and defaults 
of prior years and shall make ample provisions for the 
payments thereof. 
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Now let us turn our attention to the present contract. 
Firstly} under the terms of this contract, the City is obli-
gated in no way to pay any amount proportionate or other-
wise of the estimated operating and maintenance charges of 
the District for the next succeeding calendar year or any 
year. Secondly} as pointed out heretofore, the City can not 
be called upon to make payment or any payments what-
soever to the District in the event the District fails to 
provide and furnish the services agreed upon. We wish to 
note that in our opinion this is a very important distinc-
tion between the present case and the Barlow case. Thirdly} 
the District in this case is in no way impowered by law or by 
the terms of the contract to levy any special taxes upon the 
property within Layton City in order to raise amounts 
sufficient to pay the service charge totals that may accrue 
against the City. This is likewise a very important distinct-
ion between the present contract and the Clearfield Contract. 
(It should be noted in passing that under the present con-
tract the Board of Trustees of the Sewer District have no 
power over City affairs such as provided for in the Clear-
field Contract.) We emphasize that in the present contract 
the only remedy the District has in the event of the failure 
of the City to pay any amount that may acrue under the 
contract is the right to bring suits and to institute litigation 
against the City and its officials as may be necessary to 
require performance of the contract by the City. 
To briefly sum up the comparative analysis between 
the two contracts, it is fair to say that under the present 
contract, the City cannot be compelled to pay any part of 
the operating expenses of the District, the City cannot be 
compelled to pay the amount specified in the contract un-
less the services are furnished and that the District has 
no power under law or any power granted under the con-
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tract to levy special taxes against the property lying within 
Layton City, and the District has no power to levy annual 
taxes to make up any deficiences or defaults of prior years 
upon the part of Layton City. As noted, this Court looked 
in favor upon the Clearfield contract and held that it did 
not create an obligation or debt within the meaning of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, specifically Article XIV, 
Sections 3 and 4, notwithstanding the features of the con-
tract which we have heretofore above referred to and which 
said features are not contained in the Layton contract now 
under attack before this Court. 
(E) THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON MUNI-
CIPAL DEBT ARE NOT HERE APPLICABLE AT ALL 
BECAUSE THERE IS NO DEBT OR OBLIGATION TO 
PAY ON THE PART OF LAYTON CITY IN ANY RE-
SPECT WHATSOEVER. 
In further discussing the question of whether the total 
of the installments involved in the Barlow vs. Clearfield 
Case} supra, are a debt or indebtedness of the City as those 
terms are used in Article XIV, Sections 3 and 4 of the 
Constitution, the Court cited the case of Barnes vs. Lehi 
City} 279 P. 878 as follows: 
"We have decided related problems but never 
directly decided this question. In Barnes vs. Lehi 
City} we held with most jurisdictions that the terms 
debt and indebtedness as used in constitutional debt 
limitation of municipalities is given a meaning much 
less broad and comprehensive than it bears in general 
usage." 
The Court still in the Barlow vs. Clearfield case then 
stated: 
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"Later in Conder vs. University of Utah) 257 
P. 2nd. 367) we refused to apply the "restricted 
special fund" theory wherein we said, 'in the event 
of failure to pay the indebtedness, the State would 
be under no obligation to appropriate money from 
general taxes to pay it. Such an obligation is not a 
debt in the contemplation of the constitutional lim-
itations.' " 
The Court further quoted with approval the following: 
"If the validity of the "special fund doctrine" be 
assumed, the debt affected by constitutional limi-
tations is an obligation for the payment of which the 
levy of taxes may be required. It is inconsistent with 
that assumption to treat as debt an obligation for 
the payment of which taxation cannot be required." 
The Court still in the Barlow-Clearfield case then went 
on to rule as follows: 
"Thus it is clear that whether or not the City 
can be coerced into levying a tax to pay the obli-
gation either directly or indirectly, is held to be a 
strong factor in determining whether an obligation 
is a debt of the City. Here it is clear that the City 
cannot be coerced into levying a tax to meet this 
obligation, although it may pay the whole or a part 
thereof from water revenues or other sources. If 
the City fails to make any part of such payment, 
the balance must be collected through a tax levied 
by the Board of Directors of the District upon the 
property within the City. The water was allotted to 
the City upon its petition. The City will distribute 
the water deliverd under such allotment and collect 
the revenues for the use thereof. We hold that these 
facts do not make this a debt of the City/) 
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Applying this latter reasoning to the present case, it 
is clear that Layton City under the present contract cannot 
in any way be coerced into levying a tax to pay the obliga-
tion, either directly or indirectly, although, it may pay the 
whole or any part thereof from revenues derived from 
operations of its sanitary sewer collection system or from 
any other source. Unlike the City in the Barlow case, in 
the present case, if the City fails to make any part of the 
payment which is to become due, the District Board cannot 
in this case levy a tax upon the property within the City to 
enforce payment. 
(F) THE CONTRACT IS FOR PERIODIC PAYMENTS 
FOR SERVICES AS FURNISHED-CONTINUING SERV-
ICE CONTRACT DOCTRINE. 
We are therefore of the opinion that the present case, 
in relation to the precise point now under consideration, 
falls clearly within the doctrine and under the ruies, regu-
lations, and interpretations of the Court as outlined and 
adjudicated in the case of Barlow vs. Clearfield City Corp-
oration, supra, and in relation to the question of constitution-
al debt limit as above discussed and as under consideration is 
now 'Stare Decisis' by the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah. 
Notwithstanding this fact, it may be well for us to con-
sider some cases from other juridictions bearing from this 
particular subject. As stated, the case of Walla lValla vs. 
Walla Walla Water Company) supra, was a case decided by 
the Supreme Court of the United States and is undoubtedly 
the most quoted case on this subject. Before proceeding to 
other jurisdictions, it might be well to note that this Court 
in Barnes vs. Lehi City) supra, quoted with approval the 
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case of Shields vs. City of Loveland) 218 P. 913. This Court 
there said: 
"In Shields vs. City of Loveland) supra, the 
contract and the ordinance there in question, re-
quired the City to pay $5,000 dollars per annum for 
street lights for not less than 10 years. This the 
Court held not to be a debt but only a method of 
paying annually for street lights annually furnished. 
The general rule is that such contracts being for 
services to be paid for periodically are merely ar-
rangements to pay for current expenses as they are 
incurred. (Citing cases.)" 
In McBean vs. Fresno City) a California case reported at 
44 P. 358) the facts were as follows. The City of Fresno 
entered into a contract with Plaintiff by which Plaintiff 
agreed to take care of and dispose of sewage of the City of 
Fresno for a period of five years for the sum of $4,500.00 
per year. No natural means were available for the disposition 
of its sewage. It had provided sewers that had no provisions 
for the care of their contents. They were to be discharged 
beyond the city limits, but before the sewers could be used, 
a sewer farm was necessary for the reception and tratment 
of waste matter. The City had secured no such farm. Under 
the circumstances, the contract with McBean was entered 
into. It was contended that the contract amounts exceeded 
the debt limitations under provisions similar to those of the 
State of Utah. In making a determination upon this matter, 
the Courts opinion stated: 
"When we come to consider the contract provis-
ions, it is at once seen that the City cannot be liable in 
any one year for more than $4,900.00, an amount far 
within the revenue derived to the sewer fund and 
further, it canot become liable for this amount at all 
until faithful service rendered by the contractor 
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each year. We have our views upon the conviction 
that at the time of entering into the contract, no debt 
or liability is created for the aggregate amount of 
the installments to be paid under the contract, but 
that the sole debt or liability created is that which 
arises from year to year in separate amounts as the 
work is performed. These views find abundant sup-
port in the adjudicated cases of this State." 
In Smilie vs. Fresno County, 44 P. 556, the Court re-
iterated the doctrine laid down in the McBean Case. The 
Smilie case involved a contract for payment for construction 
of a cow1ty courthouse over a period of years, the aggregate 
of which payments would surely be in excess of the consti-
tutional limitations. Here the Court upheld and reiterated 
the doctrine in the JVIcBean case. Numerous other cases 
reached the same results as those reached by this Court in 
Barlow vs. Clearfield, supra, and as reached by L,e California 
Court in the McBean and Smilie cases. 
In Shields vs. City of Loveland, supra, the Colorado 
Court, in considering whether this constituted the debt of 
the City said: 
"Plaintiffs insist, however, that the revenue 
bonds constitute a debt and so the lawful limit is 
exceeded. We do not think that they amount to a 
debt within the intent of the Constitution or statute. 
The definitions of the word "debt" are many; and 
depend upon the context and the general subject 
with reference to which it is used, 17 C.J. 1371. 
Its meaning in the sections of the Consitution and 
Statute now before us must be determined by their 
purpose which was to prevent the overburdening 
of the public or bankruptcy of the municipality. 
Clearly, the revenue bonds are not within that pur-
pose. The public can never be overburdened by that 
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which it is rmder no obligation to discharge, nor can 
the City become bankrupt by what it does not have 
to pay, nor are these bonds a technical debt. Nothing 
is my debt unless a judgment for its amount can be 
recovered against me upon it." See Larimer County 
vs. Fort Collins, 189 P. 929; Evans vs. Holman, 
91 NE 723; :JVIoline vs. Pope, 79 NE 587. This point 
was likewise decided by Mr. Justice Burke, then 
on the District bench in Nothern Colorado Power 
Company vs. Longmont". 
"Is the agreement to pay into the funds 
$5,000.00 per annurn for street lights a debt? We 
think it is not. The clause in question reads as fol-
lows: 
" '(B) For street lighting purposes the City of 
Loveland hereby irrevocably convenants with each 
and every holder of said revenue bonds issued under 
the provisions of this ordinance, that it will pay into 
said fund not less than $5,000.00 per annum.' 
"Fundamentally, this is a method of paying 
anually for street lighting annually furnished, and 
it has been held that such contracts do not create 
debts within the meaning of laws like those in 
question. Leadville Gas Company, 49 P. 268; Denver 
vs. Hubbard, 68 Pac. 993; Valpariso vs. Gardener, 
49 A.R. 416; Uhler vs. Olympia, 151 P. 117. The 
first of these cases involved the statute requiring 
an apropriation for every city contract and it was 
held that a like contract for 25 years was not within 
the requirement. The analogy is not perfect, but 
worthy of consideration. In the second case, however, 
the Court of Appeals had under consideration not 
only the same point but also the section of the Con-
stitution now in question. It did not decide the direct 
question, whether or not the contract created the 
debt within the meaning of the Constitution, though 
it is suggested that it did not, but based its decision 
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on the proposition that, if it did create a debt, it was 
but for one year's payment, citing many cases. The 
reasoning of these cases is that such a contract 
creates no debt until the goods are delivered or serv-
ices renderd, and it would seem to follow that all the 
payments under such a contract, would no more 
constitute an indebtedness than one of them." 
In further support of this position, we cite some of the 
cases sustaining this view: 
City of Laport vs. Gainwell Fire Alarm Tele-
graph Co., 45 NE 588, 37 LRA NS 1063; Weston 
vs. Syracuse, 17 New York 110; Lewis vs. Brady, 
17 Idaho 251, 104 P. 900; Smilie vs. Fresno County, 
112 Cal. 311, 44 P. 556; Moore vs. Springfield, 16 
ALR 2nd. 502; Vandergrif vs. Riley, California Case, 
16 P. 2nd. 734; Tumey vs. Bridgeport, 6479 Con-
ecticutt 229, Vos vs. Waterloo Water Co., 163 In-
diana 69, 66 LRA 95, 106 ASR 201; Farmers State 
Bank vs. Conrad, Montana case, 47 P. 2nd. 853, 
37 LRA, new series 1042; Saleno vs. Neosho, 30 
Southwestern 190; Allison vs. Chester, 72 SE 472. 
At Section 463 of lVIunicipal Corporations, 38 American 
Jurisprudence, page 144, there is a very enlightening discus-
sion of this problem. It is therein stated: 
"According to the weight of authority, a con-
tinuing contract for the furnishing of electric, water 
or other services to a municipality for which the 
municipality agrees to pay in periodic installments as 
the service is furnished, does not give rise to a pres-
ent indebtedness for the amount of all the install-
ments to become due thereunder throughout the 
whole term of the contract, within the meaning of a 
constitutional or stafutory limitation of municipal 
indebtedness, and such a contract is not rendered 
invalid by the fact that the aggregate of the install-
ments exceed the debt limit." 
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The section then goes on to give a further and more 
complete analysis of this problem and also states the minor-
ity view which has developed in a few jurisdictions. We 
humbly suggest that the adoption of the minority view and 
the discarding of the weight of authority on this matter 
would have the effect of denying countless numbers of 
municipal corporations and the citizens thereof, much need-
ed essential and necessary improvements such as, adequate 
water supplies, lights, sidewalks, streets, curbs, gutters, 
and sanitary sewer disposal facilities. We appreciate the 
founding fathers' philosophy and the reason for the writing 
of prohibitions upon creation of debt into the Constitution of 
the State of Utah. It is evident that they intended that future 
generations should live under a "pay as you go basis", and 
in the instant case, we are of the opinion and submit to this 
Court that Layton City, in entering into this instant con-
tract, is doing exactly that. 
The contract is one to obtain a much needed municipal 
service for the use and benefit of all the inhabitants of the 
City and will be paid for on a monthly or annual basis, 
strictly within the estimated revenues for each monthly or 
annual period. Though the aggregate amount paid over the 
term of the contract or any number of years would be in 
excess of the constitutional provisions, it is not a debt or 
obligation within the meaning of the Consitution. We hold 
it is merely a contract for timely and necessary services as 
the same are provided and furnished by the District in the 
same manner that the City would buy building materials, em-
ploy workmen or labor or in any manner, purchase or lease 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services for legal Municipal 
Corporate purpose. 
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The rule laid down in the Walla Walla case and in the 
McBean vs. Fresno case) is most cogent. As there pointed out, 
in the continuing service contract, "the indebtedness is not 
created until the consideration has been furnished." In 
our case, the District undertakes monthly to render a serv-
ice, namely, provide and have available for Layton City, 
adequate sewer disposal facilities. We respectfully submit 
that this agreement is within the "continuing service" type 
contract and under the rule of the Walla Walla case) the 
Loveland Case and as approved by this Court in Barnes 
vs. Lehi City and under the McBean vs. Fresno Case which 
latter is almost analogous with the present case that no 
debt is created within any constitutional limitations. We 
believe the foregoing conclusively answers any contention 
that might be raised, that this agreement is not within 
the "continuing service contract" doctrine. Nevertheless, 
we bring to the Court's attention, two recent decisions on 
factual situations somewhat similar to ours. 
In Robins vs. City of Rapid City) 23 N.W. 2nd 144_, 
Rapid City had taxable property in the amount of 
$10,000,000, an outstanding indebtedness of $300,000, and 
current net income of $55,000. The City intered into a con-
tract with the United States, whereby the United States was 
to construct a reservoir to make water available to the 
City and allotted to the City the preferred right to 7,000 
acre feet of water to be stored therein. The City, "for its 
supply of water", agreed to pay the United States $500,000 
in forty successive, equal annual installments of $12,500 
each, plus operation and maintenance charges. The Court, 
in considering the type of contract before it, observed: 
"According to the weight of authority, a con-
tinuing contract for the furnishing of electricity, 
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water or other service to a municipality for which 
the municipality agrees to pay in annual installments 
as the service is furnished, does not give rise to 
a present indebtedness for the aggregate amount of 
installments to become due. 44 C.J. 1130." 
A long list of cases supporting this rule and a very few 
opposed thereto, appears in the note in 103 A.L.R. 1160. The 
leading case is the City of Walla Walla vs. Walla Walla 
Water Co.) 172 U.S. 1) (cited and quoted supra). The othe1· 
case is that of Hillard vs. City of Mobile) 1,7 Southern 2nd. 
162. There the City of Mobile, in order to secure and main-
tain an adequate water supply for its inhabitants, entered 
into a contract with the Water Works Board of the City of 
Mobile, a separate public corporation for a water supply. 
Such corporation is referred to as the "Board". As to the 
financial situation of the City of lVIobile, the Court states: 
"On account of its growth and expansion with-
in the last decade, Mobile has outgrown its present 
existing water works system and source of supply. 
Although, the city is still below or within its con-
stitutional debt limitations, the amount necessary 
to acquire or construct a water works system to 
adequately meet the present and future needs of the 
City would create debts over and beyond said con-
stitutional debt limitations. The Board, in order to 
construct the works and provide the supplies to fill 
its contract with the City, issued its revenue bonds. 
By its contract, the Board agreed to meet the City's 
requirements to the extent of twenty-five million 
gallons per day, and for such water, the City agreed 
to pay at the rate of $288,000 per year, payable in 
monthly installments of $19,000." 
In this regard, the Court said: 
"Stripped of all surplusage, under the terms of 
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the proposed contract between the Board and the 
City, the Board agrees to furnish the City with a 
sufficient volume of raw water to adequately meet 
the City's present and future requirements includ-
ing a standby volume to meet emergncies. The City 
agrees to pay, therefore, the amount named in the 
contract and at the time and the manner provided 
therein." 
The Court, commenting upon this situation, further 
analyzed the problem and stated it as follows: 
"Appellant's argument is in substance that a 
contract calling for future periodical payments, 
creates a debt of the City in violation of Sections 222 
and 225 of the Constitution of 1901. In a few states, 
the rule has been adopted that as soon as such a 
contract is entered into indebtedness to the amount 
of the aggregate future payments is deemed to be 
incurred, irrespective of any condition connected 
with the furnishing of water. See Dillon on Muni-
cipal Corporation, (5th Ed.), Page 359, Section 196. 
But the same section of that authority also states 
that: 
" 'By the weight of authority and, as we think 
reason also favor a more liberal construction of the 
constitutional limit upon the power to incur indebt-
edness. Municipal contracts calling for future pay-
ments extending over a series of years, usually re-
late to water, light, or some other municipal matter 
which is regarded as a prime vital importance to 
the inhabitants. If the municipality has already 
reached its constitutional limit of indebtedness, it 
is obviously debarred from purchasing or estab-
lishing a plant of its own and is forced to contract 
with some corporation or individual that is willing 
to incur the large expense necessary in erecting 
works upon the faith of the City paying annual 
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rentals or other stipulated compensation. A con-
struction,· therefore, of these provisions which will 
debar the City from entering into a contract cover-
ing a period of years by making the aggregate 
amount to be earned and to be paid thereunder im-
mediate indebtedness of the City, would be disas-
trous to the City's interest; and a City which has 
already reached the constitutional limit of indebt-
edness, or whose indebtedness closely approaaches 
that limit, would be as effectually debared from 
making such a contract as it is from purchasing 
or contracting for the construction of works of its 
own. The Courts have, therefore, recognized a dis-
tinction between a debt in the sense of the Consti-
tution, and a contract for a future indebtedness to 
be incurred upon the performance by the contracting 
party of the agreement out of which a debt may 
arise. They also recognize a distinction between 
the latter case and one where an absolute debt is 
created at once, as by the issue of bonds for the 
erection of a public improvement, though such debt 
is payable in the future by installments. In the one 
case, the indebtedness is not considered to be cre-
ated until the consideration has been furnished; 
in the other, the debt is created at once, the time 
of payment only being postponed. The Courts, there-
fore, have generally held that contracts by municip-
alities for a supply of water, light, or other like nec-
essary, by which the municipality binds itself for 
the payment of the annual rental or other periodical 
consideration for the water or light furnished, do 
not create indebtedness until the property con-
tracted for has actually been furnished, and the 
municipality n1ay contract to make such yearly or 
periodical payments, notwithstanding that the ag-
gregate of such payments during the stipulated life 
of the contract, may exceed the amount of the in-
debtednes limited by the Constitution or by a charter 
provision.' " 
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The Court then observed that under Alabama law, a 
lVIunicipal Corporation, in order to anticipate and provide 
for its necessities in years to come and make present con-
tracts for them without creating a debt, must make the 
annual payments payable out of current revenues for that 
year, but in order to maintain the legality of the particu-
lar contract under consideration, held that this requirement 
was met. We are of the opinion that such a requirement 
here has adequately been met and that we have heretofore, 
in this argument, successfully demonstrated that any amount 
that may become accrued against Layton City and in favor 
of the District by reason of the payments specified in the 
contract, will, of necesssity, always be within the estimated 
current revenues of said City for each and every year. 
(G) NO DEBT OF LAYTON CITY WITHIN THE CON-
STILTUTIONAL MEANING OR OTHERWISE HAS BEEN 
CREATED. 
The Plaintiff contends that Layton City has acted 
outside and in excess of its lawful powers in contracting 
with the Sewer District for sewer disposal and treatment 
service, by reason that the contract has resulted in a debt 
to Layton City in excess of its constitutional limits. For the 
purpose of the argument heretofore made, we have assumed 
that the contract resulted in an obligation on the part of 
the City to make the monthly payments but have demon-
strated that the agreement comes within the continuing serv-
ice doctrine and does not result in the creation of a debt 
in excess of constitutional limitations. 
We would, however, before leaving the points here 
involved, desire to briefly argue and demonstrate that no ob-
ligation for the payment of any sum, anytime, has been 
created on the part of Layton City, and hence, the con-
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tention that Layton City has exceeded its debt limiation, 
is wholly without merit. We refer at the outset to the mean-
in of the word debt or indebtedness, as those words are 
used in Article XIV of our Constitution, particularly Sec-
tions 3 and 4. In Condor vs. University of Utah, a Utah case, 
supra, the Court quotes with approval from an article en-
titled, Municipal Improvements as Affected by Constitut-
ional Debt Limitations, 37 Columbia L. R. 195 as follows: 
"It is inconsistent with that assun1ption to treat 
as a debt an obligation for the payment of which 
taxation cannot be required." 
And further in the same case the Court said: 
"In the event of a failure to pay the indebted-
ness, the State would be under no obligation to 
appropriate money from general taxes to pay it. 
Such an obligation is not a debt in the contemplation 
of the constitutional limitations.)) 
In Barnes vs. Lehi City, supra the Court observes: 
"The City cannot be coerced into applying any 
part of its general revenue for the payment of the 
purchase price of the plant or any part of the cost 
of maintenance thereof. We are of the opinion that 
by entering into the proposed contract with Fair-
banks Morse and Co., Lehi City will not thereby 
create such an indebtedness as is contemplated by 
Section 4 of Article XIV of the Utah Constitution." 
It seems accordingly that a debt or indebtedness with-
in the constitutional limitations applicable to municipali-
ties must be constituted of an obligation which the City is 
legally obligated to pay and which it can be coerced into 
paying from its general revenues. 
At the risk of being repetitious, we wish once again to 
refer the Court to the terms of the contract to determine 
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the obligation to pay, if any, which Layton City here has 
assumed under the terms of the contract. As set forth in 
paragraph three, the City agrees to pay a stipulated sum per 
month for each unit connected to its sanitary sewer system 
and in the cases of churches, schools and commercial or 
industrial establishments a stipulated amount per month 
based upon the gallonage metered to each establishment. 
The contract specifically provides that payment shall be 
computed upon the number of sewer customers connected 
to the City sewer system on the last day of each calander 
month. Such number shall determine the amount due for 
such month. Thus there is a clear indication that the City 
assumes no obligation to pay or incurs no indebtedness 
until the end of the monthly period after the service has 
been furnished to the City by the District. The contract 
further provides that the District shall never have the 
right to demand payment of any obligation devolving upon 
the City under the agreement from funds raised or to be 
raised from taxation. We think that stripped of all surplus-
age that the contract means simply that Layton City agrees 
to buy a much needed service from the North Davis County 
Sewer District and pay, therefore, a sum certain to be deter-
mined at the end of each month after the service has been 
rendered to the City by the District. We are, therefore, of the 
opinion that the Defendants , have successfully met the 
Plaintiff's objection to the contract as outlined in Sections 
I and II of Plaintiff's Brief. 
m 
THERE DOES EXIST CONSTITUTIONAL AND STAT-
UTORY AUTHORITY FOR LAYTON CITY TO ENTER 
INTO THE CONTRACT. 
The Plaintiff urges as point Number 3 that there is 
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no constitutional or statutory authority that will allow 
Layon City to enter into a long term contract such as here-
in involved, and that by the terms of the contract it is both 
arbitrary and unreasonable and extends for an unreasonable 
term which obligates future City Councils in regards to 
the subject matter. We will consider these matters in the 
same order that they are raised by the Plaintiff's Brief. 
We direct our attention first to the contention that 
there is no constitutional or statutory authority allowing the 
City to enter into the contract. We direct the Court's at-
tention first to Article XI, Section 5, subsection B, Con-
stitution of Utah, which reads as follows: 
HThe power to be confered upon Cities by this 
Section shall include as follows: 
(B) To furnish all local public services, to pur-
chase, hire, construct, own, maintain or operate or 
lease public utilities, local in extent and use; to 
acquire by condemnation or otherwise within or 
without the Corporate limits, property necessary for 
any such purposes subject to restrictions imposed by 
general law for the protection of other communities; 
and to grant local public utilities franchises and 
within its powers, regulate the size thereof." 
We now refer to the statutory provisions applicable 
to the designation of powers granted to Municipal Corpor-
ations of the State of Utah. 
Section 10-7-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides 
as follows: 
"CITIES AND TOWNS AS POLITICAL BODIES-
COMMON SEAL. 
Cities and towns shall be bodies political and 
and corporate with perpetual succesion. They shall 
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be known and designated by the name and style 
adopted, and under such name may sue and be sued, 
make contracts and acquire and hold real and pers~ 
onal property for corporate purposes. They shall 
have a common seal and may change the same at 
pleasure." 
Section 10-8-2, Appropriations, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, (APPROPRIATIONS-ACQUISITION 
AND DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY. 
"The cities may appropriate money for corp-
orate purposes only and provide for payment of 
debts and expenses of corporations; may purchase, 
receive, hold, sell, lease, convey and dispose of 
property, real and personal for the benefit of the City 
both within and without its corporate boundaries, 
improve and protect such property and may do all 
other things in relation thereto as natural persons, 
provided that it shall be deemed a corporate purpose 
to appropriate money for any purpose which in the 
judgment of the Board of Commisioners or City 
Council may provide for the safety, preserve the 
health, promote the prosperity and improve the 
morals, peace, order and comfort and convenience of 
the inhabitants of the City." 
Respecting the power of a municipality to protect 
the health of the inhabitants of the City, we refer to and 
quote the following statutory provisions: 
SECTION 10-8~61. REGULATIONS TO PREVENT 
CONTAGIOUS DISEASES-QUARANTINE-GAR-
BAGE DISPOSAL. 
"They may make regulations to secure the 
health of the City, prevent the introduction of con-
tagious, infectious or malignant diseases into the 
City, and make quarantine laws and enforce the same 
within the City limits and within twelve miles there-
of."* 
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Respecting the subject more nearly at hand, to wit; the 
disposal of City sanitary sewage, we refer the Court to the 
language of Section 10-8-38 U. C. A. 1953. 
SEWAGE AND WATER SYSTEMS, CONSTRUC-
TION, REGULATION AND CONTROLS, CHARG-
ES FOR USE, COLLECTION OF CHARGES, ETC. 
"Boards of Commissioners, City Councils and 
Boards of Trustees of Cities and Towns may con-
struct, reconstruct, maintain and operate sewage 
treatment plants, culverts, drains, sewers, catch 
basins, manholes, cesspools, and all systems, equip-
ment and facilities necessary to the proper drainage, 
sewage and sanitary sewage disposal requirements 
of the City or Town and regulate the consruction 
and use thereof. Any city or town may for the pur-
pose of defraying the cost of construction, recon-
struction, maintenance or operation of any sewer 
system or sewage treatment plant, make a reason-
able charge for the use thereof. In order to enforce 
the collection of such charge, any city or town 
operating a water works system may make one 
charge for the combined use of water and services of 
the sewer system, including the services of any sew-
age treatment plant operated by the city or town 
and may provide by ordinance that application for 
service from such combined systems shall be made in 
writing, signed by the owner desiring such service 
or his authorized agent."* 
In the 1953 session the Legislature completely re-wrote 
and re-enacted Chapter 6 of Title 17, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. This act is designed to allow the creation of improve-
ment districts, such as the Defendant District, which dis-
tricts may be established in any county or counties in the 
State and the main purpose for which is to collect, dispose 
of and treat sanitary sewage. It will be noted that the act 
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specifically provides that the boundries of such districts 
may include Municipal Corporations. It is our contention 
that the act was created and passed by the Legislature be-
cause the legislative body recognized the financial impos-
sibility of each municipality separately establishing and 
constructing adequate, modern sewage disposal and treat-
ment plants. There can be no doubt from a reading of the 
act that the framers fully intended that the municipalities 
included within any given sewer district, indirectly would 
and could contribute financial aid and support to the district. 
It is perhaps unfortunate that the act itself did not specific-
ally spell out the method, manner or means by which the 
municipalities could contribute to the district and, there-
fore, share in the ultimate goal desired by all parties inter-
ested, to wit; the disposal and treatment of sanitary sew-
age within any given area. 
The Legislature meeting in 1955, apparently recog-
nizing what might have been a failure in not defining the 
powers of cities and towns to contract with sanitary dis-
tricts for services, passed and adopted an act referred to as 
Chapter 26, Section 2, which reads as follows: 
"CONTRACTS BETWEEN MUNICIPALITES AND 
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS-AUTHORITY TO 
FIX SERVICE CHARGES. 
When any Municipal Corporation shall con-
tract with any district operating under Chapter 6 
of Title 17 as amended for the supplying of sewage 
treatment and disposal service or both by such dis-
trict to such Municipal Corporation, such Municipal 
Corporation shall have authority to make, there-
fore, such appropriate service charge to each party 
connected with the sewer system as it shall deem 
reasonable and proper. If such Municipal Corpor-
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ation operates a waterworks system the charge 
aforesaid may be combined with the charge made 
for water furnished by the water system and may be 
collected and a collection thereof secured in the 
same manner as specified in Section 10-8-38, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953." 
An analysis of this aforesaid section will clearly indi-
cate that the Legislature in passing this section assumed the 
power of Municipal Corporations to enter into contracts 
with sewer districts operating under Chapter 6 of Title 17 as 
amended; and thus recognizing such powers went on to 
provide in said section that such Municipal Corporations 
shall have authority to make, therefore, such approp-
riate service charges to each party connected with its system 
as it shall deem reasonable and proper. 
It is our interpretation of this section that the purpose 
of the same was to grant to the Municipal Coporations the 
power to make such additional sewer service charge from 
the individual parties as might be necessary to compensate 
the sewer district for its services under any contract that 
the city may enter into for the purpose of securing such 
services for sanitary sewage disposal and treatment. This 
seems to be the only fair interpretation that can be placed 
upon the wording of the section; for it is acknowledged that 
prior to the enactment of said section, cities and towns had 
already been possessed of the power to levy sewer service 
rates upon its inhabitants for the use of the cities local sew-
age collection system, and that the Legislature now recog-
nized the fact that the City additionally, thereto, should have 
the power to levy such additional charges as might be neces-
sary to fulfill the City's commitments under any contracts 
entered into with the sewer districts that might be created 
under Chapter 6 of Title 17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
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amended. We feel that the Constitution and Statutory ci-
tations above set forth fully meet and dispose of the Plain-
tiff's contention under Point Number III. We think the fore-
going fully illustrates that such a contention is without basis. 
Plaintiff's other contention as raised under point ITI 
will be answered under point V where the same objections 
are again raised in detail by Plaintiff. 
IV 
THE CONTRACT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A LENDING 
OF THE CREDIT OF LAYTON CITY TO THE DISTRICT. 
Plaintiff cites Article VI, Section 31, Constitution of 
Utah and claims as his position that by virtue of the 
contract Layton City is undertaking, at least in part, to 
construct the sanitary sewer system facilities for the Dist-
rict. Plaintiff complains that the contract was entered into at 
a time when no services were being rendered to the City 
by the District. 
The facts do not bear out this contention. Layton City 
was at the time of entering into the contract being serviced 
by the District in the disposal of its raw sanitary sewage, 
and had been serviced by the District's predecessor, the 
Metropolitan Sewer District, since the year 1946. It is 
admitted that the District was not at that time furnishing 
treatment service for the sewage. The situation and position 
between the parties in no way supports or bears out the 
Plaintiff's assumption that Layton City was undertaking, 
at least in part, to construct District facilities. While it is 
true that certain of the charges received by the District 
from Layton City and the other municipalities within the 
the District, may eventually be used for District purposes, 
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including payment of construction costs and interest on 
and principal of bonds sold by the District, nevertheless, 
the City has no direct or indirect obligation to pay any such 
charges and cannot in any event be forced or coerced into 
payment of any such charges. All contracts entered into 
by the District for construction and for repayment of bonds 
issued by the District are direct obligations of said District 
and the City can under no circumstances or pretext be called 
upon to make any payments upon such obligations. 
Let us now turn our attention to the legal restrictions 
placed upon the municipalities of this State in respect to 
the lending of credit. Plaintiff relies upon Article VI, Section 
31, Constitution of Utah as prohibiting Layton City from 
entering into said contract. Plaintiff alleges that the con-
tract constitutes a lending of the credit of Layton City in 
violation of this section of the Constitution which reads as 
follows: 
"The Legislature shall not authorize the State, 
or any county, city, town, township, district or 
other political subdivision of the State to lend its 
credit or subscribe to stocks or bonds in aid of any 
railroad, telegraph or other private individual or 
corporate enterprise or undertaking." 
To us it is clear that the intent of the framers of the 
Constitution in writing said section was to prevent the lend-
ing of public credit to private enterprise. This to us seems 
clear from the type of enterprise referred to in said sction. 
Note the use of the words "any railroad) telegraph or other 
private) individual or corporate enterprise or undertaking". 
Of course, in the entity of the North Davis County Sewer 
District, we have no such private undertaking. Said District 
is a public creature owned "lock, stock and barrel" by the 
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inhabitants and taxpayers of North Davis County who are 
resident within the physical boundries of said District. Aside 
from the distinction as above pointed out, it is our position 
that Layton City is in no event lending its credit to the 
North Davis County Sewer District. Plaintiff relies upon 
Atkinson vs. Board of Commissioners of Ada County 
(Idaho) 108 P. 1046. We have no quarrel with the conclu-
sions reached in that case, but are of the opinion that it has 
no application to the case at hand. In that case it is clear 
that there was an outright attempt to use public money for 
private enterprise. 
Such is not the situation in the contract here under con-
sideration. Under title of Municipal Corporations, 38 Am. 
Jur. Section 401, page 93, we find the following enlightin-
ing discussion on the matter at hand. We quote: 
"GIVING FINANCIAL AID OR LENDING 
CREDIT.--"In many jurisdictions there are constitu-
tional provisions which prohibit the Legislature 
from granting to Municipal Corporations the power 
to lend their credit or grant money or things of 
value to any individual, association, or corporation 
and prohibit Municipal Corporations from making 
any appropriation or donation or in any way lending 
their credit to any individual corporation or associa-
tion. Such provisions are generally construed as 
directed against benefits at public expense, attempt-
ed in behalf of individuals, corporations or associa-
tions as such, acting independently in conducting 
some enterprise of their own such as are usually 
conducted for profit and are commercial in nature. 
It has been held that a Municipal Corporation may 
withour violating either a constitutional provision 
which prohibits it from appropriating or lending 
money to corporations or associations or a provision 
which declares that such Municipal Corporations 
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shall never lend their credit for any purpose, issue 
warrants in payment of money advanced to a local 
improvement district located wholely within the 
municipal limits, to complete the construction of the 
improvement. The money in such case is spent for a 
public and not a private purpose .... " 
Such action was held not to be violative of the type of 
constitutional prohibition we have here, by the Court in the 
case of Bank of Commerce vs. Huddleston) 291 Southwestern 
1,22. We refer the Court also to the annotations contained 
at 50 A.L.R. 1208. 
See also Vol. 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporation, Section 
1870 page 434, and State vs. Florida Keyes Aqueduct Com. 
4- So. (2nd) 662 and Burrough of Runnemede vs. New Jersey 
Water Co.) 8 A. (2nd) 576. 
A reading of the foregoing and a consideration of the 
terms of the contract will amply demonstrate that said 
contract under no interpretation constitutes a lending of the 
City's credit, and in no event a lending of credit prohibited 
by the wording of the Constitution of Utah. 
v 
THE CONTRACT IS NOT UNREASONABLE AND 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT IT CONSTITUTES AN 
ATTEMPT BY THE PRESENT COUNCIL TO OBLIGATE 
FUTURE COUNCILS WITH RESPECT TO GOVERN-
MENTAL MATTERS. 
Th Plaintiff urges that the contract is unreasonable 
and unconstitutional in that it constitutes an attempt by the 
present City Council of Layton City to obligate future City 
Councils of Layton City with respect to governmental 
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matters. Plaintiff urges that the contract entered into takes 
from future City Councils the right to enter into a better 
arrangement in regard to this matter for at least the period 
of the contract. In discussions of this problem, the Courts 
almost uniformly make at the outset a distinction based 
upon the subject matter of the contract, as to whether the 
subject matter is legislative or governmental or whether 
business or proprietary. 
It is admitted that if the matter is governmental or 
legislative in nature, the present council may be restricted 
from entering into such a contract where it tends to bind 
future City Councils. We think that it is here clear that the 
type of contract entered into is within the exercise of the 
business powers of the Municipal Corporation and that it 
is not controlled by any rule preventing it from entering 
into such a contract. Under Municipal Corporations, 37 Am. 
Jur. Section 66, page 679, we find the following language: 
"Acts as binding successors --- with respect to 
the power of a municipal council to enter, in behalf 
of the municipality, into a contract which will ex-
tend beyond the term for which the members of the 
council were elected, a distinction is drawn based up-
on the subject matter of the contract -- whether legis-
lative or governmental, or whether business or pro-
proprietary. Thus where the contract involved re-
lates to governmental or legislative functions of 
the council or involves a matter of discretion to be 
exercised by the council unless a statute conferring 
power to contract clearly authorizes the council to 
make contract extending beyond its own term, no 
power of the council so to do exists since the power 
conferred upon the municipal councils to exerci~ 
legislative or governmental functions is conferred 
to be exercised as often as may be found needful or 
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politic. Then the council presently holding such power 
is vested with no descretion to circumscribe or limit 
or diminish their efficiency, but must transmit 
them unimpaired to their successors, 'but in the 
exercise of business powers of a Municipal Corpora-
tion, the municipality and its officers are controlled 
by no such rule, and they may lawfully exercise 
these powers in the same way and in their exercise 
the municipal·ity will be governed by the same rules 
which control a private individual or business cor-
poration under like circumstances. Under this dis-
tinction, it is generally held that a Municipal Cor-
poration may contract for a water supply) street 
lighting, gas supply) etc. and bind subsequent boards) 
such contracts being made in the exercise of the 
City's business or proprietary functions. One of the 
leading cases supporting this latter view is Walla 
Walla vs. Walla Walla Water Co. 172 U.S. 1) here-
tofore cited upon another point, wherein the Court 
said: 
'The argument that the contract is void as an 
attempt to barter away the legislative power of 
the City Council rests upon the assumption that 
contracts to supply the City with water are within 
the police powers of the City, and may be controlled, 
managed, or abrogated at the pleasure of the 
council. This Court has doubtless held that the 
police power is one which remains constantly under 
the control of the legislative authority, and that 
a City Council can neither bind itself nor its success-
ors to contracts prejudicial to the peace, good order, 
health, or morals of its inhabitants; but it is to cases 
of this class that these rules have been confined ... , 
but where a contract for a supply of water is 
innocuous in itself, and is carried out with due re-
gard of the good order of the city and the health of 
the inhabitants, the aid of the police power cannot 
be invoked to abrogate or impair it." 
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In Farmers State Bank vs. Conrad, supra, on another 
point, facts were that the City agreed to buy water for 
thirty years out of gross revenues from the sale of the 
water. It was contended that the City exceeded its powers 
by contracting for such an extended time. The Court on the 
point said: 
"In the case of State Ex. Rel. Great Falls Water-
works vs. Mayer and City Council of City of Great 
Falls, 19 Mont. 518; 49 Pac. 15, this Court held that 
in making such a contract as the one under consid-
eration, the municipality acts under its Proprietary 
powers and not under its legislative, public, or 
governmental powers, and it was there held that 
the power granted a city by the legislature to 
contract for and procure a water supply are plenary 
and unlimited save for the duty to exercise them 
with reasonable care." 
See also Charleston vs. Littlepage 51 LRA (NS) 352. 
See also 63 C.J.S. Mun. Corp., Section 973, page 523 
and 538 under sub-division 'Sanitation and Public Health', 
also the annotated case thereunder, Cunningham vs. Cleve-
land, 98 Fed. 657. 
We have already under Point ill above referred the 
court to the statutory and constitutional citations setting 
forth the express granted powers of Municipal Corporations 
in Utah with respect to the subject matter at hand. It seems 
well established by the authorities that Municipal Corp-
orations have the implied powers to carry out all express 
granted powers, and have those implied powers which 
are necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers 
expressly conferred, or those essential to the accomplish-
ment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation. 
A long line of cases support this view respecting implied 
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powers. It would thus appear that it would be a fair state-
ment to say that Layton City in entering into the instant 
contract did so not only by express granted power, but 
that the execution of the contract and the aims and objects 
thereof are necesarily implied as being within the power of 
the City Council of Layton City to obtain for and fuFnish to 
it inhabitants the necessary facilities for sewage disposal 
and treatment. In 37 Am. Jur. Municipal Corporations, 
Section 117, Page 731, in a discussion of this matter, we 
find the following language: 
"Thus where the Legislature delegates power to 
a Municipal Corporation to establish a public im-
provement, such as a sewer system, that delegation 
carries with it all the incidental powers necessary 
to carry its object into effect within the law, for the 
grant of power would be useless if unaccompanied 
with sufficient authority to carry it into effect." 
See also McBean vs. Fresno) 44 Pac. 358) supra on an-
other point. Here the facts concerned a contract for sew-
age disposal-very similar to this case-the court held 
this type of contract binding on successor Councils of the 
City. 
In view of the Supreme Court case cited and the other 
cases, and the weight of authority with respect to this mat-
ter, we are of the opinion that the Plaintiff's objection as 
set forth under his Point V is without merit and that it 
does not apply to the instant case which is purely a contract 
within the functions of Layton City, and is a contract to 
obtain much needed services for the City and the inhabi-
tants thereof, and is not governmental or legislative in 
character. 
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VI 
THE CONTRACT IS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
AND ITS TERMS ARE NOT UNREASONABLE AND 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT REQUIRES LAY-
TON CITY TO KEEP IN FORCE DURING THE TERM OF 
THE CONTRACT AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT MAND-
ATORY THAT BUILDINGS WITHIN A REASONABLE 
DISTANCE OF AN ESTABLISHED SEWER COLLEC-
TION MAIN BE CONNECTED TO SUCH MAIN. CITY 
HAS RIGHT TO SO CONTRACT. 
We now address ourself to Plaintiff's sixth and final 
point. Plaintiff contends the contract is unconsitutional 
because it contains the provision that the City will during 
the tenn of the contract maintain and ordinance requiring 
all buildings and structures in said City used for residence, 
commercial or industrial purposes, and which are within 
a reasonable distance of an established sewer collection 
main, to be connected to such main. Plaintiff urges in 
support of his position, that such an ordinance would be 
invalid because it is vague and ambiguous for the reason 
that the term "reasonable distance" is used, rather than 
establishing a set or stipulated distance. He urges, that, 
therefore, what is a reasonable distance would be left 
to the changing discretion of changing City Councils. 
Plaintiff cites the case of Bigler et al vs. Greenwood, a Utah 
case, reported at 254 P. 2nd 843. In that case the Court 
held valid and enforcible an ordinance which required house-
holders whose property was within 200 feet of the sewer 
to connect with the sewer. Plaintiff urges that such a rul-
ing is good, but that the present contract is bad because no 
established or stipulated distance is well defined. 
We take the position that this court should not rule 
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that the contract is bad because of the agreement to main-
tain in force an ordinance requiring all buildings and 
structures to be connected which are within a reasonable 
distance from an extablished sewer collection main. Plaintiff 
assumes that some future council may be unreasonable in 
the exercise of its statutory and municipal authority to 
compel residents to connect to established sewers. We think 
that the presumption is .in favor of City Councils and Boards 
of Commissioners in acting in a reasonable and prudent man-
ner in the administration of the affairs of the City, and 
that each case should be determined upon its own merits, 
when and if, presented to a court for review. We sincerely 
urge that this Court should not presume against the reas-
onableness of municipal governing bodies. We note in passing 
that the contract was drawn using the words 'within a 
reasonable distance' rather than attempting to specify an 
exact distance within which people would be required to 
connect to the sewers. This undoubtedly was done by the 
framers of the contract, the representatives of the Sewer 
District and the representatives of the municipality, for 
the reason that all parties concerned recognize that whereas 
there are nine or ten separate communities located within 
the Sewer District, there might well be and probably will 
be varying local conditions which will require each City 
Council to pass and adopt an ordinance compelling connec-
tion to it municipal collection system in accordance with 
local conditions, standards and requirements. We grant that 
what might be reasonable in Layton City, might under a 
local situation be unreasonable in Sunset City, Clearfield 
City or one of the other municipalities within the District. 
Therefore, it is urged that this matter was left to the 
discretion and reasonableness of each City Council in each 
municipality. 
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The section of the contract to which the Plaintiff here 
objects is the last paragraph in numbered paragraph three 
of the contract as set forth at the top of page 5 thereof. 
We do not interpret this paragraph to mean that each 
City Council in passing an ordinance requiring connection 
to its sanitary sewer system will use the exact wording 
"within reasonable distance of an established sewer col-
lection main". We interpret this to be the language of the 
contract between the District and the City and are further 
of the opinion that the District under the wording of this 
paragraph could not complain against the City regardless 
of the stipulated number of feet used in its local ordinance 
compelling connection to the sewer system, if the Court 
in interpreting the contract at hand determined that the 
distance employed in the local ordinance was "within a 
reasonable distance". We, therefore, admit that what is 
a "reasonable distance" is left to the changing discretion 
of the changing City Councils, and it was so intended, the 
District having no intention of dictating matters of local 
policy to the local City Council, but intending only and 
merely that wherever a commercial, residential or indust-
rial structure was within a reasonable distanace, to be 
determined by the local council, that the City would re-
quire connection to such sanitary facilities. To allow 
any person, firm or corporation to make his or its own 
determination as to when connection should be made to the 
City's sanitary sewer collection system would defeat and 
nullify the entire purpose and intention and use and desir-
ability of the City's sanitary sewer collection system and 
the facilities to be afforded by the District. Without some 
definite means of compelling the use of the sewers both with-
in and without the City limits of all persons, firms and 
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corporations within the boundries of the District would be 
to completely nullify the purpose of the City's sanitary 
efforts as well as the Sewer District itself and would result 
in a situation of complete and utter chaos where a goodly 
part of the population would afford itself of the facilities 
and the balance would refuse so to do. 
With respect to the City's powers in connection with 
these matters, we refer the Court to Municipal Corporation, 
37 Am. Jur., Section 288, at p. 925 which is as follows: 
"As a matter of settled generalization and with-
in the scope of their powers as granted by the stat-
utes in charter or both or by constitutional provis-
ions, Muncicipal Corporations may enact all approp-
riate ordinances or promulgate appropriate regu-
lations for the protection or preservation of the 
public health and to control whatever constitutes 
a menace thereto. The control of local health and 
sanitary matters is one of the powers commonly 
vested in municipalities and is among the chief 
duties of municipalities under and in connection with 
their police powers.'' 
More in point we quote from 9 Am. Jur., Buildings, 
Seetin 14 at P. 209-210, where in it is stated among other 
things: 
"Statutes and ordinances compelling owners of 
buildings to install water closets and to connect 
their premises with public sewers when not plainly 
unreasonable or arbitrary are also within the police 
powers. An arbitrary exercise of this power may be 
restrained but it must be palpably so to justify a 
.Court in interferring with so salutary a power 
and one so necessary to the public health." 
In Fristoe vs. Crowley 76 Southern 812) it is stated: 
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"An ordinance allowing ample opportunity to 
property owners to furnish their own material and 
have their premises connected with the public sewage 
system and authorizing the City upon default of an 
owner to construct for the work to be done at his 
expense has been upheld.'' 
In Gault vs. Fort Collins) a Coloardo case) 142 P. 171} 
the Court held that a City has a statutory authority to com-
pel owners of buildings in a sewer district to connect with a 
sewer, and also to prohibit the maintenance of privies within 
the sewer district. In view of these cases and a multitude of 
others which uniformly hold that Municipal Corporations 
have the authority to legislate upon such matters and compel 
property owners to connect their buildings with sanitary 
sewers provided by the municipality or by some other 
agency to be valid, we are of the opinion that the contract 
under question is not invalid or unconstitutional merely 
because the prase, "reasonable distance" is used rather than 
a stipulated distance. Granted that the municipality has 
the authority to pass and enforce such ordinances, then 
the only question remaining for decision by this Court is 
whether the use of the phrase "within a reasonable distance" 
is so arbitrary or ambiguous as to make the contract void. 
We sincerely urge as above pointed out that, that language 
is used in the contract and that there is not from the word-
ing of the contract any attempt to coerce or compel 
City to use that phrase in any ordinance legislating upon 
the subject. However, assuming that Layton City did use 
this phrase in an enforcement ordinance, we urge the 
Court that such a phrase would not invalidate the ordinance 
and that a Court would not restrain the City from enforc-
ing such an ordinance if a rule or regulation under the 
ordinance relating to the distance within which users must 
56 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
connect to the sewer was by the Court determined to be with-
in a reasonable distance. That is to say that we urge that it is 
not the wording of the ordinance or the contract in this 
case that would make the same invalid or unconstitutional, 
but an attempted application of the usuage of the words and 
phrase "within a reasonable distance". We feel that the 
Court should not as above pointed out, presume against 
the reasonableness of future City Councils, and that the 
Court on the other hand should assume that all future 
Councils or City Commissions will conduct and operate the 
business of their municipalites within a reasonable, prudent 
and well maner. 
Plaintiff further contends that the City has no legal 
right to agree as a matter of contract that it will compel 
such connections. It is well recognized that a Municipal 
Corporation cannot contract to surrender any of its granted 
or implied powers. However, such is not the case here. In 
the contract under consideration, the City does not agree 
not to use its police powers to compel connection to its 
sanitary sewer system, but on the contrary agrees that 
it will exercise such powers in this regard in a reasonable 
manner. We think the court will clearly recognize the 
distinction between an attempt upon the part of the City 
to delegate or surrender its granted or implied powers, and 
the case where the City merely agrees that it will use its 
granted and implied powers toward a common goal within 
the corporate powers of said lVIunicipality and for the use, 
benefit and good of the inhabitants thereof. 
The list of cases holding that a Municipality may not 
surrender its powers, police or otherwise, is almost limit-
less, however, we have been unable to find any cases holding 
that a city or municipality may not contract or agree with 
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another political subdivision to exercise its police powers or 
other granted powers for the use and benefit of its inhabi-
tants. As pointed out previously, there can be no doubt that 
Layton City has the right to engage in providing for its 
inhabitants, a method and means of proper sanitary sewage 
disposal and treatment, and further that there is no doubt 
that it has the right to use its police power to enforce con-
nections to its sanitary sewage system in the interest of and 
for the preservation of the peace, health, and safety of the 
inhabitants of said City. Therefore, in entering into a con-
tract with the District, whereby the City agrees that it 
will use such power as herein stated for the purpose of 
enforcing connections to its system it appears that the 
City is merely exercising a well recognized granted author-
ity received from the legislature of the State of Utah 
and is in no way attempting to limit, subvert or surrender 
its statutory or constitutional powers in this regard. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons hereinabove set out, we respectfully 
submit that the contract between Layton City and the 
North Davis County Sewer District here under consider-
ation, either as a whole or by its collective parts has notre-
sulted in the creation of a debt on the part of Layton City, 
however, if the Court should decide that a debt on the part of 
Layton City has been created, nevertheless, it is not a debt in 
violation of constitutional limitations for the reason that it 
arises out of a contract of the continuing service type. 
We further respectfully submit that there does exist 
constitituional and statutory authority for Layton City to 
enter into the contract, that the contract does not constitute 
an unconstitutional lending of the credit of Layton City to 
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the District, that the contract is not unconstitutional as an 
attempt by the present City Council to obligate future City 
Councils with respect to governmental matters; and lastly we 
submit that the City has a legal right to agree as a matter of 
contract that it will compel connections to its sanitary sewer 
system. For these reasons the alternative writ heretofore 
issued herein should be recalled and discharged and the 
petition for a permanent writ should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM H. KING 
ROGER BEAN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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